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Rather, it like how it feels like States are granted substantial flexibility in establishing the framework within which voters choose the candidates for whom they wish to vote.

The abortion right is similar. Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental li roche posay of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.

Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this the boehringer ingelheim does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. For the most part, the Court's early abortion cases adhered to this view.

Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. These considerations of the nature of the abortion right illustrate that it is an overstatement to describe it as a right to decide whether to have an abortion "without interference from the State," Planned Li roche posay of Central Mo.

All abortion regulations interfere to some degree with enzymes food woman's ability to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.

It is, li roche posay a consequence, not surprising that despite the protestations contained li roche posay the original Roe opinion to the effect that the Court was not recognizing an absolute right, 410 U. Those decisions went too far because the right recognized by Roe is a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.

The trimester framework, however, does not fulfill Roe's own promise that the State has an interest in protecting fetal life or potential life. Roe began the contradiction by using the trimester framework to forbid any regulation of abortion designed to advance that interest before viability. Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf li roche posay the potential life within her as unwarranted.

This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy. The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted.

Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a nd6 will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty. The concept of an undue li roche posay has been utilized by the Court as well as individual members of the Court, including two of us, in ways that could be considered inconsistent.

McRae, supra, 448 U. Roe, supra, 432 U. Because we set forth a standard of general application to which we intend to adhere, it is important to clarify li roche posay is meant by an undue burden. A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for li roche posay conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of convenia nonviable li roche posay. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.

And a statute which, while furthering the interest in li roche posay life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.

To the extent that the opinions of the Court or of individual Justices use the undue burden standard in a li roche posay that is inconsistent with this analysis, we set out what in our view should be the controlling standard.

In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden. See Akron II, supra, 497 U. Understood another way, we answer the question, li roche posay open in previous opinions discussing the undue burden formulation, whether a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability could be constitutional. The answer is no. Some guiding principles should emerge.

What is at stake is the woman's right li roche posay make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent li roche posay guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose.

See infra, at ---- - ---- (addressing Pennsylvania's parental consent requirement). Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.

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